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INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, the “sharing economy” has
proven more challenging to regulate than perhaps any other
commercial industry in recent decades. An exact definition of the
“sharing economy” is hard to pin down, however, the term is
typically thought to refer to companies that either “(1) own goods
or services that they rent to consumers on a short-term basis, or
(2) create peer-to-peer (“P2P”) platforms connecting providers
and users for short-term exchanges of goods or services.”1 The
variety of companies that embody the sharing economy are as
numerous as they are creative, and each presents its own set of
regulatory needs and challenges. Yet of the companies that
comprise the “sharing-economy,” the need for regulation is most
apparent for companies that provide for home-sharing, such as
Airbnb, Inc., HomeAway, Inc., and Couchsurfing International,
Inc. Though their respective target demographics differ, each of
these home-sharing providers are similar in that they create
digital P2P marketplaces that allow users all over the globe to
rent and lease empty space in their homes for the short-term.
While this practice is economically beneficial in a number of
respects (utilization of an untapped resource, financial gain,
increased tourism, etc.), oftentimes such benefits come at the
expense of others.
When a user of one of the above-referenced home-sharing
websites lives in a residential neighborhood and lists their
property as a short-term rental, they are essentially
commercializing a residential area. Unregulated, this activity
causes nuisances in single-family-neighborhoods typically
associated with commercial activities, such as noise, traffic, and
transients. Such nuisances threaten the integrity of single-family
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neighborhoods and the property values of the homes therein,
causing outrage amongst the residents in the neighborhood who
chose not to rent out space in their homes. But it is not only
residential areas that are affected, for even if a user of a
home-sharing website lists an apartment for rent short-term,
rather than a single-family-home, harm to the general public still
results. As one apartment goes up for rent on a home-sharing
website, one unit of housing disappears from the regular rental
market.2 In many cities this practice has an exacerbating effect
on the housing market, causing availability to fall and the cost of
living to rise.3
Compelled by the threat that home-sharing poses to
single-family neighborhoods and its negative impact on the
rental housing market, cities across the United States have
attempted to regulate digital home-sharing markets.4 These
regulations are based on traditional, business-to-consumer
business models and thus target the actual suppliers of
short-term rentals—those who list properties for rent on
home-sharing websites—rather than the platform providers,
i.e. the websites.5 However, because home-sharing websites
utilize P2P business models, supply of the service is
decentralized, rendering regulations based on a business-toconsumer model largely ineffective.6 This is because the
decentralized nature of home-sharing makes it difficult for
violators of regulations to be discovered, thereby reducing
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2 See generally L.A. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, HOUSING ELEMENT 2013-2021,
CHAPTER 1: HOUSING NEEDS ASSESSMENT (Dec. 3, 2013), http://planning.lacity.org/Housing
Initiatives/HousingElement/Text/Ch1.pdf [http://perma.cc/5MFQ-G5WF].
3 Id.
4 To name just a few, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, Portland, Chicago,
and Philadelphia are cities that are currently attempting to regulate home-sharing. See
Marielle Mondon, S.F. Is Struggling to Make Good on Airbnb Regulation, NEXT CITY
(Mar. 25, 2015), http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/san-francisco-airbnb-regulation-problems
[http://perma.cc/3AJP-FD47]; Robert Holguin, Los Angeles City Leaders Want to Regulate
Home-Sharing Websites Like Airbnb, KABC EYEWITNESS NEWS (Dec. 5, 2014),
http://abc7.com/news/la-city-leaders-want-to-regulate-home-sharing-websites-like-airbnb/
424126/ [http://perma.cc/WD8Z-KBDD]; Ronda Kaysen, What’s Up Next in New York?
Airbnb and Rent Regulation Will Be Hot Topics, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/28/realestate/new-york-airbnb-and-rent-regulation-willbe-hot-topics.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/K23B-2QRT]; Steve Law, Airbnb Resists City
Efforts to Regulate It, PORTLAND TRIB. (Dec. 18, 2014, 8:14 PM), http://portland
tribune.com/pt/9-news/244479-112102-airbnb-resists-city-efforts-to-regulate-it [http://perma.
cc/YAB7-P5LH]; Alby Gallun & Ally Marotti, Hotels to Airbnb Hosts: Pay Up, CRAIN’S
CHI. BUS. (Feb. 14, 2015), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150214/ISSUE01/3021
49989/hotels-to-airbnb-hosts-pay-up [http://perma.cc/MLD6-8FAC]; Mike Dunn, Phila.
Lawmakers Move Toward Regulating, and Taxing, Airbnb Room Rentals, CBS PHILLY
(June 1, 2015, 2:05 PM), http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2015/06/01/phila-lawmakers-movetoward-regulating-and-taxing-airbnb-room-rentals/ [http://perma.cc/J974-GH6V].
5 See infra Part II.
6 Id.
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incentive to comply. Thus in several cases, even where
regulations prohibit home-sharing in a specific neighborhood or
area, because there is substantial profit to be made and little
chance of discovery, home-sharing continues, unabated.7
If regulatory efforts fail, the costs of home-sharing are borne
by those who are not involved in its practice (“non-sharers”).8 In
single-family neighborhoods, non-sharer residents continue to
experience nuisances typically associated with commercial
activity, resulting in the loss of enjoyment of their property and a
potential decrease in the monetary value of the property.9 At the
same time, non-sharer inhabitants of rental dwellings in the city
continue to experience rent increases, causing the cost of living to
rise.10 As these problems continue, the number of aggrieved
parties will grow and the aggregate damages will become
substantial. As history has shown, once a tipping point is
reached, a lawsuit will follow—a lawsuit that may just be the
cost-shifting mechanism needed to address the negative
externalities caused by home-sharing.
Based on precedent cases involving P2P business models and
common-law rules of third-party liability, a class of individual
landowners may one day bring and win a monumental lawsuit
against home-sharing websites that will change the way
home-sharing websites operate within the United States. While
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7 Examples of regulation failure can be observed most clearly in San Francisco and
Los Angeles. See Emily Alpert Reyes, Los Angeles Gives Hosts, Neighbors Mixed Signals on
Short-term Rentals, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
local/california/la-me-adv-illegal-rentals-20150208-story.html#page=1 [http://perma.cc/FWJ7DYSY]; see also Matt Weinberger, San Francisco Complains It Can’t Enforce Its Own Airbnb
Law, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 23, 2015, 4:41 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/san-franciscocalls-airbnb-regulations-unenforceable-2015-3 [http://perma.cc/F7J6-3VZS].
8 See Steven Leigh Morris, Airbnb Is Infuriating the Neighbors. Is It Time for New
Rules?, L.A. WKLY. (Jan. 22, 2015, 2:47 PM), http://www.laweekly.com/news/airbnb-isinfuriating-the-neighbors-is-it-time-for-new-rules-5343663 [http://perma.cc/GL67-3ECU];
Benjamin Mueller, Hearing Pits Tenants Who Denounce Airbnb Against Those Who Profit
From It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/21/nyregion/ hearingpits-tenants-who-denounce-airbnb-against-those-who-profit-from-it.html [http://perma.cc/KC4V8NZM].
9 See Morris, supra note 8; see also Walter Hamilton, Renting Rooms Through
Airbnb Riles Fellow Homeowners, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 19, 2013, 6:56 PM),
http://www.seattletimes.com/business/renting-rooms-through-airbnb-riles-fellow-homeowners/
[http://perma.cc/KL2S-M5AB].
10 See Daniel Hirsch, Report: Airbnb Cuts into Housing, Should Share Data, MISSION
LOCAL (May 14, 2015, 5:00 PM), http://missionlocal.org/2015/05/report-airbnb-cuts-intohousing-should-give-up-data/ [http://perma.cc/5TB6-2AUS]; Caroline O’Donovan, The Rent
Is Too Damn High: In Search of the Truth About Airbnb’s Impact on Housing, BUZZFEED
NEWS (June 9, 2015, 3:59 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/the-rent-is-toodamn-high-the-truth-about-airbnbs-impact-on#.mqaP1YmG5 [http://perma.cc/X2ZY-P6LD];
see also Rachel Monroe, More Guests, Empty Houses, SLATE (Feb. 13, 2014, 8:08 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2014/02/airbnb_gentrification_how_the
_sharing_economy_drives_up_housing_prices.html [http://perma.cc/H9BM-RR8U].
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See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005).
Id.; see also supra note 11.
14 See Ron Harris, Napster Offers $1 Billion Settlement, ABC NEWS (Feb. 20, 2001),
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=98832 [http://perma.cc/DUY6-KBWA]; see also
Ben Fritz, Grokster Plays Nice by Turning Radio Dial, VARIETY (Nov. 15, 2004, 3:56 PM),
http://variety.com/2004/biz/markets-festivals/grokster-plays-nice-by-turning-radio-dial-111
7913569/ [http://perma.cc/CFZ6-LYKR]; John Borland, Last Waltz for Grokster, CNET
(May 30, 2006, 11:10 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/last-waltz-for-grokster/ [http://perma.cc/
J7AU-EJMC].
11
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home-sharing is a recent phenomenon, digital P2P markets have
been around since the late 1990s, and have already been the
impetus for a pair of pivotal judicial decisions.
In 1999, a class of recording producers brought suit against
the infamous Napster Inc.,11 and in 2004, a class of film producers
brought suit against Grokster Ltd., Napster’s more sophisticated
cousin.12 Interestingly, the stories of these lawsuits are remarkably
similar. In each case, a company utilized a business model based
on digital P2P marketplaces,13 and each company thrived for a
time, but at the expense of other entities in their respective
industries. Eventually the costs which had been passed on to the
other companies in the industry grew so large, it came to a
tipping point, and a class-action lawsuit was brought. As a
result, both Napster and Grokster were held accountable for
the negative externalities each had caused.14 Napster and
Grokster were then left to either abandon their business for fear
of future lawsuits, or re-evaluate their business models and
conceive methods of doing business lawfully. In other words,
Napster and Grokster were compelled by lawsuits to address
and mitigate the negative externalities each had caused.
These cases exemplify how the common law can act as a
cost-shifting mechanism for the negative externalities of P2P
markets, and provide a framework outlining more effective
regulations for home-sharing. Despite the fact that legislative
regulation fails to shift the costs of harms caused by
home-sharing back onto the companies that create them, the
costs can still be shifted—and home-sharing can be successfully
regulated—if a class of plaintiffs successfully brings suit against
a home-sharing company. Once a lawsuit is successful,
home-sharing companies will be compelled to re-evaluate their
business practices and formulate methods of conducting business
that do not expose the company to liability.
This Comment is divided into three parts. Part I details two
of the most common negative externalities caused by
home-sharing, identifies who bears the costs of those
externalities, and discusses the legislative attempts by various
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municipalities to address them. Part II explains why legislative
attempts to address negative externalities of home-sharing are
ineffective. Part III then offers how, based on precedent P2P
cases and common law rules of private nuisance and third-party
liability, the common law is an adequate mechanism for shifting
the costs of the negative externalities of home-sharing onto the
companies that create them, so that these companies may finally
be successfully regulated.
I. THE NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OF HOME-SHARING
Generally speaking, a negative externality is an indirect cost
of a commercial activity that is borne by society or bystanders
outside of the industry rather than the commercial enterprise or
individuals conducting the activity.15 The number of negative
externalities that result from the unregulated, wide-spread practice
of short-term renting made possible by home-sharing websites
are numerous and substantial. However, there are two
externalities in particular that are most common in cities across
the United States: the negative effect of wide-spread
home-sharing on residential neighborhoods, and the negative
effect of wide-spread home-sharing on the rental housing market.
A.
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15 Thomas Helbling, What Are Externalities?, FIN. & DEV. (December 2010),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2010/12/pdf/basics.pdf [http://perma.cc/783F-2JNW].
16 Will Airbnb Have to Check Out of Silver Lake?, EASTSIDER (Aug. 14, 2013),
http://www.theeastsiderla.com/2013/08/will-airbnb-have-to-check-out-of-silver-lake/ [http://
perma.cc/3KG3-8SQA].
17 Id.
18 Id.
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The Effect of Home-Sharing on Residential Neighborhoods
Los Angeles, California has experienced nearly all of the
negative externalities associated with home-sharing on residential
areas given the density and high cost of living. As is the case in
many Los Angeles areas, home-sharing is a popular practice in
the neighborhood of Silver Lake.16 In 2013, Silver Lake was the
location of at least 200 listings for short-term rentals on
Airbnb.com, ranging from studio apartments for $60 per night, to
entire homes complete with swimming pools for $425 per night.17
Yet despite the numerous home-sharers in the area, many
residents were strongly opposed (“non-sharers”) to the practice of
home-sharing in their neighborhood. In fact, the non-sharers of
Silver Lake were so opposed to home-sharing that they
eventually petitioned their local government to enact an outright
ban on short-term renting through home-sharing websites like
Airbnb.com in the neighborhood.18
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Non-sharers in Silver Lake opposed home-sharing with as
much vigor and animosity as they would the development of a
commercial short-term rental establishment such as a hotel or
inn. They asserted that the “hotel-like room rentals,” made
available by home-sharing websites like Airbnb.com “bring
transients, traffic,” and “create potential safety issues.”19 These
are legitimate concerns for homeowners because property values
are typically higher in quieter, secluded, crime-free areas.20 But
when land is put to commercial use, such as a hotel or retail
store, the noise and traffic levels of the area increase as a result
of people coming and going, and the transient nature of the
establishment can increase the crime rate.21 Thus, by their nature,
commercial uses in residential areas cause the values of the
surrounding residential properties to fall, and the loss of value is
borne by the residents, not the home-sharing websites.22
In an effort to mitigate the negative impact of home-sharing
on the neighborhood and restore their properties to their original
perceived value, the non-sharers of Silver Lake petitioned the
neighborhood council to pass a resolution that would ban all
short-term rentals within the neighborhood.23 At a meeting to
discuss the resolution, more than 150 residents of Silver Lake
appeared.24 While there were plenty of non-sharers present to
bemoan the parking shortages, increased transients, and
excessive noise caused by home-sharing,25 also present at the
hearing were members of “Peers,” an Airbnb lobbyist group
whose self-proclaimed mission is “to grow the sharing economy,
to mainstream it, to tell its story, and to protect it.”26 Ultimately,
the non-sharers were outnumbered by the Peers, and the resolution
to ban short-term renting on home-sharing websites did not pass.27
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Id.
Mandi Woodruff, 9 Things That Will Trash Your Home’s Value, BUS. INSIDER
(May 13, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-hurts-home-value-20135?op=1 [http://perma.cc/N2CY-EX35].
21 See generally John M. Quigley & Larry A. Rosenthal, The Effects of Land Use
Regulation on the Price of Housing: What Do We Know? What Can We Learn?, 8
CITYSCAPE: 1 J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 69 (2005), https://www.huduser.gov/periodicals/cityscpe/
vol8num1/ch3.pdf [http://perma.cc/GXF7-8YGA].
22 Id.
23 Neal Broverman, Silver Lakers Want to Ban Airbnb Rentals in Their
Neighborhood, CURBED L.A. (Aug. 14, 2013, 6:16 PM), http://la.curbed.com/archives/2013/
08/silver_lakers_want_to_ban_airbnb_rentals_in_their_neighborhood.php [http://perma.cc/
N7Y6-XKYN].
24 Zak Stone, The Battle Over Airbnb Moves to Los Angeles, CO.EXIST (Sept. 17, 2013,
8:23 AM), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3017486/the-battle-over-airbnb-moves-to-los-angeles
[http://perma.cc/LYU4-3YTM].
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
19
20
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Regardless of who won the battle of Silver Lake, it is clear that
unregulated home-sharing has a costly impact on residential
communities. Similar disputes over whether home-sharing should
be regulated have taken place not only in other neighborhoods
throughout California such as Venice and West Hollywood, but
also in cities across the United States including New Orleans,
Louisiana, and Portland, Oregon.28 Thus, it would seem that no
matter the city, widespread unregulated home-sharing brings
nuisances to residential areas, thereby lowering the values of all
homes in the neighborhood, and leading non-sharers to demand
regulation. While the story of Silver Lake demonstrates that, for
the time being, non-sharers are in the minority, this does not
change the fact that the cost of the degradation of the
neighborhood is borne by residents who do not participate in
home-sharing.
B.
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28 See Stevie St. John, Airbnb Is Raising the Ire of WeHo Apartment Managers and
Tenants, WEHOVILLE (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.wehoville.com/2014/03/14/airbnbraising-ire-weho-apartment-managers-tenants/ [http://perma.cc/CNE5-AYVK]; see also
Juliet Bennett Rylah, WeHo Might Ban Airbnb, LAIST (Feb. 4, 2015, 1:15 PM), http://
laist.com/2015/02/04/weho_considers_banning_airbnb.php [http://perma.cc/U5U7-8N9A];
Robert McClendon, Battle Brewing over Short-Term Rentals, as Residents Discuss Airbnb,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 20, 2014, 9:51 PM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/05/
battle_brewing_over_bed_and_br.html [http://perma.cc/H34E-K28M]; Elliot Njus,
Portland Tries to Make Peace with Airbnb as ‘Sharing Economy’ Moves into the
Mainstream, OREGONIAN (Jan. 31, 2014, 5:18 AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/ frontporch/index.ssf/2014/01/airbnb-style_vacation_rentals.html [http://perma.cc/7WTK-CRP7].
29 See L.A. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, supra note 2.
30 See generally Denise Cheng, Is Sharing Really Caring? A Nuanced Introduction to
the Peer Economy, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND. (Oct. 2014), http://static.opensocietyfoundations.
org/misc/future-of-work/the-sharing-economy.pdf [http://perma.cc/4VRE-E2PK].
31 See Hirsch, supra note 10; O’Donovan, supra note 10.
32 See L.A. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, supra note 2, at 1–3.

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 132 Side A

Pressure on Housing Market
In addition to the costs that home-sharing places on
non-sharing homeowners in single-family neighborhoods, the
proliferation of home-sharing also generates costs for renters.29
Home-sharing websites reduce traditional barriers to entry into
the hotel industry, and thus, more and more landlords and
leasing companies are converting long-term rental units into
permanent short-term rental units or de facto hotels.30 As a result,
the number of rental units available on the market is falling, and
the market is shrinking.31 Such shrinkage has an exacerbating
effect on the high cost of living in dense areas such as San
Francisco, New York City, and Los Angeles.32 But just like the
cost of lowered property values in single-family neighborhoods,
this higher cost of living is borne by those who do not participate
in home-sharing.

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 132 Side B

05/09/2016 12:16:02

Do Not Delete

604

5/6/16 1:57 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 19:2

In some respects, the practice of home-sharing is fairly
consistent with the practice of running a hotel. Generally
speaking, the success of any given hotel can be attributed to its
reputation and visibility.33 Hotels spend hundreds of thousands
of dollars on amenities and employees in order to gain the
reputation of a clean, comfortable, and safe hotel.34 In addition,
hotels spend significant sums of money on advertising in order to
increase visibility and draw guests. Successful home-sharing
relies on similar techniques. Just like a hotel, home-sharers must
establish their reputation, and then advertise their short-term
rental properties in order to draw guests. But where hotels have
money to spend on amenities and advertising, the average
homeowner or renter does not.
If in fact a homeowner or renter had a spare room and was
willing to rent it short-term, the search for a short-term tenant
could be challenging and ineffective. Advertising for the room
would be done either on community bulletin boards, newspapers,
or word-of-mouth. Granted, the emergence of Craigslist made
advertising easier and more effective (as anyone with an internet
connection gained the ability to broadcast an advertisement
capable of reaching unlimited viewers), but as the breadth of the
advertisement increased, so did the risk for hosts and guests.35
Once the advertisement spreads beyond the scope of the
neighborhood, would-be hosts and guests have no way to vet one
another.36 Therefore, prior to the recent rise of home-sharing
websites, for most prospective home-sharers advertising a
residential property as a short-term rental either failed to reach
enough prospective guests or it posed an unacceptable degree of
risk, and thus home-sharing occurred on a much smaller scale.37
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33 See generally Pedro Colaco, 10 Success Tips on Online Visibility for Independent
Hotels, HOTEL BUS. REV., http://hotelexecutive.com/business_review/2120/10-success-tips-ononline-visibility-for-independent-hotels [http://perma.cc/DAP9-UKT5]; Vanessa Horwell,
How to Market Your Hotel Today for Success Tomorrow, HOTEL BUS. REV.,
http://hotelexecutive.com/business_review/2139/how-to-market-your-hotel-today-for-successtomorrow [http://perma.cc/4EBE-THMJ].
34 See Sam Trotter, How Much Does it Cost to Build a Hotel – 2015, BOUTIQUE
HOSPITALITY MGMT. (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.boutique-hospitality.com/how-much-doesit-costs-to-build-a-hotel-2015/ (stating midscale hotels spend on average $95,600 on
building and site improvements; full service hotels spend roughly $193,600; and luxury
hotels and resorts spend roughly $392,600) [https://perma.cc/3VJB-3L26].
35 David C. Wyld, Renter Beware: Craigslist is Fast Becoming the Go-to Site for
Rental Property, But the Lack of Trustworthiness Makes the Prospect of Renting Via the
Internet a Very Risky Proposition Indeed, WEB.ARCHIVE (June 7, 2012) https://
web.archive.org/web/20160115133914/https://www.escrow.com/news/Articles/craigslist_is_
fast_becoming_the_go-to_site_for_rental_property/16 [http://perma.cc/WP2H-W5HM].
36 Id.
37 Airbnb in the City, N.Y. ST. OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (Oct. 2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/
Airbnb%20report.pdf [http://perma.cc/BZD3-7ZXY].
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See generally Wyld, supra note 35.
Cheng, supra note 30, at 5.
40 See generally How It Works, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/getting-started/
how-it-works [http://perma.cc/Z48L-SLJ6].
41 Cheng, supra note 30, at 17.
42 Id.; see also Tim Logan, Emily Alpert Reyes & Ben Poston, Airbnb and Other
Short-Term Rentals Worsen Housing Shortage, Critics Say, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015,
3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/realestate/la-fi-airbnb-housing-market-2015
0311-story.html#page=1 [http://perma.cc/HBC7-WNTQ].
43 See Roy Samaan, Airbnb, Rising Rent, and the Housing Crisis in Los Angeles,
LAANE: A NEW ECONOMY FOR ALL (Mar. 2015), http://www.laane.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/03/AirBnB-Final.pdf [http://perma.cc/6C6J-E737].
44 Id. at 18.
38
39
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Presently, however, home-sharing websites like Airbnb.com
have essentially eliminated these problems, thereby greatly
reducing traditional barriers to entry to the hotel/home-sharing
industry for individuals and commercial enterprises alike. Through
user rating systems, home-sharing websites like Airbnb.com create
a substitute for trust that reduces the risk of home-sharing for
both hosts and guests.38 Hosts can see which guests have the
highest reputations as respectful guests, and guests can see
which hosts have the best reputation for providing well-kept
rooms and amenities.39 This manufactured trust drastically
reduces costs for homeowners seeking to list their property for
rent, as their reputation becomes established through user reviews.
The cost of advertising is likewise eliminated, as home-sharing
websites make it possible for home-sharers to be globally visible
for free.40 Through their sophisticated user interfaces, home-sharing
websites allow any listed property to be viewed by any potential
guest at any time when they use the website’s search function.
Thus, the user who seeks to rent out space in his or her home
need not invest any more in advertising than the cost of a few
pictures. Accordingly, home-sharing websites have substantially
reduced the cost of entry into the home-sharing/hotel industry for
both individuals seeking to self-employ, and commercial entities
seeking to establish de facto hotels.41
Lower barriers to entry to the hotel industry result in
conversion of residential units into rental accommodations on a
much larger scale than ever before.42 For instance, in Los Angeles
(and in other cities as well) whole units, as opposed to a spare
bedroom within a unit or a shared unit, dominate the listings on
home-sharing websites.43 Of all the Airbnb listings in Los Angeles,
sixty-four percent are for entire units, while thirty-two percent
are for private rooms, and four percent are for shared rooms.44 Of
the entire-unit listings, six percent are rented out by what can be
classified as “leasing companies,” which are property owners that

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 133 Side B

05/09/2016 12:16:02

Do Not Delete

606

5/6/16 1:57 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 19:2

C M
Y K

05/09/2016 12:16:02

Id.
Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 20.
50 The Times Editorial Board, L.A. Has a Serious Housing Crisis and It’s Time for
City Officials to Do Something About It, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://
www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-affordable-housing-part-1-20150111-story.html
[http://perma.cc/N2HK-XG9S]; see also Logan, Reyes & Poston, supra note 42.
51 The Times Editorial Board, supra note 50.
52 See Tim Logan & Emily Alpert Reyes, Airbnb Cuts Ties with Vacation-Rental
Firms in Los Angeles, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2015, 5:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
business/la-fi-airbnb-rift-20150404-story.html [http://perma.cc/EG4S-Z3MH].
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46
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list two or more whole units at a time.45 While these leasing
companies represent a minority share of the market, they actually
account for thirty-five percent of all the revenue generated by
Airbnb in Los Angeles.46
Global Homes and Condos (“Global”) is one such leasing
company. Global describes itself as “a full service vacation rental
management company,”47 and is known as “the most prolific
host” in Los Angeles, listing at least seventy-eight whole units as
short-term rentals on home-sharing websites in a cluster that
spans the border between Santa Monica and Venice.48 By using
home-sharing websites, Global is able to pit “tourist dollars
against rental dollars,” and consistently finds that it can
generate significantly more revenue by converting its long-term
rental stock into short-term rental listings on home-sharing
websites than if it were to lease the properties long term.49
Meanwhile, the city of Los Angeles suffers from a deficit of
rental housing, needing an additional 5300 units of rental
housing per year to meet demand.50 The Mayor and City Council
of Los Angeles are currently working to make the availability of
rental housing a priority by requiring developers to set aside
units for affordable housing in exchange for permitting other
development. The City is also working to preserve the number of
rental housing units on the market by “adopting a ‘no net loss’
policy that ensures subsidized units don’t disappear when
buildings are demolished or replaced.”51 Measures like these
demonstrate that the City is spending tax dollars and other
municipal resources to not only ensure that new units of rental
housing will be added to the market, but current units will
remain available. Entities like Global, however, which make
commercial use of home-sharing websites, directly hinder the
City’s goal of keeping rental housing units on the market, and
the City (i.e. taxpayers and renters) pays the costs in two ways.52
First, as more long-term rental units are converted into
permanently listed short-term rentals, the cost of living in the
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area rises.53 Second, as more of the City’s tax dollars are spent on
ensuring the supply of rental housing, less is available for other
municipal needs.
The costs generated by home-sharing that are being borne by
the City of Los Angeles are common throughout several other
cities in the United States. In response, many cities have
attempted to regulate home-sharing.54 As discussed infra, the
effectiveness of such regulation remains to be seen. However, it is
readily apparent from the regulation efforts that, just like the
negative externalities home-sharing imposes on single-family
neighborhoods, the costs that home-sharing imposes on the city
are also being borne by those who do not participate in
home-sharing.
In sum, as home-sharing becomes more widely used
throughout neighborhoods and cities in the United States,
negative externalities result, the costs of which fall on
homeowners in single-family neighborhoods where home-sharing
is particularly prevalent, and cities where rental housing is in
short supply. These externalities are substantial, leading
homeowners to petition local government for the prohibition of
home-sharing, and compelling cities to devote additional tax
dollars to maintaining adequate levels of rental housing. Thus,
the externalities created by home-sharing create a clear demand
for regulation, and unless regulation can effectively shift the cost
of those externalities back onto the home-sharing industry, those
not involved in home-sharing will continue to pay.

54
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II. INEFFECTIVE REGULATIONS
Given that home-sharing generates substantial negative
externalities, there is little doubt that the industry needs to be
regulated. Unsurprisingly, several municipalities have tried.
However, current attempts at regulation are based on normative
business-consumer (“B2C”) business models, and as such, these
regulations target the supplier of services. Thus, current
regulatory attempts have all targeted those who supply space for
rent (hosts) rather than the home-sharing websites themselves.
However, the digital P2P marketplaces utilized by home-sharing
websites thwart normative regulation methods that are effective
on traditional commercial enterprises. Digital P2P marketplaces
reduce the effectiveness of supplier-targeting regulation because
such regulation is only successful if hosts police themselves, or if
neighbors blow the whistle. Moreover, neither self-policing nor
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59 James Corbett, The Peer-to-Peer Economy—A Turning Point in Human History,
WALDEN LABS SOLUTIONS IN SELF-RELIANCE (Apr. 8, 2015), http://waldenlabs.com/peer-topeer-economy/ [http://perma.cc/82UK-X7J4].
60 Cheng, supra note 30, at 9.
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whistleblowing is occurring because there is little incentive for
hosts to self-police, there is little opportunity for neighbors to
whistle-blow, and there are few ways to actually enforce
regulations even when whistleblowing occurs. Accordingly, nearly
every attempt to regulate home-sharing, from city-wide to
neighborhood specific, has failed (with one exception discussed
infra), leading to the conclusion that a different cost-shifting
mechanism should be called upon to effectively mitigate the
negative externalities of home-sharing.
Airbnb.com and many other home-sharing websites employ a
P2P marketplace or “platform.”55 These marketplaces “act as a
meeting point between providers and customers to transact over
individual services,”56 thereby enabling individuals to monetize
skills and assets within their possession.57 The concept of a P2P
marketplace is not new, but thanks to ever-increasing internet
access and ever-falling utilization costs, companies like Airbnb
can use the internet to organize and distribute essential market
information (such as where consumers are, what they will pay,
whether they can be trusted, etc.) necessary to create a thriving,
digital, P2P marketplace.58 As the market thrives, the responsible
website takes a commission of all transactions occurring within
its digital marketplace. Thus, companies like Airbnb have turned
P2P platforms into the backbones of their operations: they allow
users to monetize resources (such as a spare room) at a rate they
would not be able to before, and for that they take a percentage of
the revenue.59
While the use of P2P platforms creates resource utilization,
as stated before, it also creates a challenge from a regulatory
perspective. Until recently, most large companies operated using
a B2C platform, which is one commercial producer/provider
selling goods or providing services to several consumers (like a
hotel chain and its guests), or business-to-business (“B2B”)
platform, where companies sell goods to secondary vendors who
sell the goods directly to the end consumer.60 Such companies can
be easily regulated because they are the initial and/or sole
producers of the product or service. Therefore, a regulation that
targets the producer/provider will be effective because the
producer/provider is the company, which has complete control
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over the product/service. For instance, if a hotel (provider)
conducts business in a way that generates a nuisance to nearby
landowners or disrupts a city’s rental housing market, the hotel
will be the target of any necessary regulation. The hotel will then
comply with the regulation because, as the producer and the
commercial establishment, its infractions will be visible, reportable,
and therefore punishable.
Companies that utilize P2P platforms, however, decentralize
control over their goods and services, and move commercial
activity into residential homes.61 The company provides the
general rules for users, but it is the user that provides the actual
services to consumers, and does so from the privacy of the user’s
own dwelling.62 In that sense, companies such as Airbnb that
employ P2P platforms are not the providers of the services
rendered on its website. Users are not employees or agents of the
company, but rather are business partners or “microentrepreneurs” making independent business decisions with
little influence from the company facilitating the transaction.63
Therefore, when regulators seek to impose regulations on
home-sharing using traditional methods that target the
producer/provider, the regulations do not target a company like
Airbnb, but rather target the users of the website, as they are the
actual providers of the service. However, because the users are
providing services from their homes, their infractions are far less
visible than those of a commercial establishment, and thus,
regulations that target the users of home-sharing websites are
largely ineffective.
Currently, the most common forms of home-sharing
regulations are zoning codes, ordinances, and Homeowner
Associations’ Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (“CC&Rs”).
Regardless of whether these regulations existed before the
advent of home-sharing websites or were enacted as a response,
they all suffer from the same fatal flaw: they target the user of
the website and not the website itself. The following hypothetical
sheds light on the problem.
Assume Louis Landowner discovers that people in his city
are making great money by listing their spare rooms on
Airbnb.com. Landowner decides to investigate, so logs onto
Airbnb.com and creates a profile. Instantly he is presented with a
geographically tailored statistic of the average revenue other
users in his area are generating monthly by listing their
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accept or reject the potential guest. See generally AIRBNB, www.airbnb.com [http://perma.cc/
7SKN-YU3X].
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properties on Airbnb.com. Seeing a lucrative opportunity,
Landowner lists a spare bedroom in his house on Airbnb.com. He
heeds the admonition on Airbnb’s website to check his local laws
and regulations and discovers that his city (like many) has an
ordinance prohibiting rentals for less than thirty days in
residential areas.
Unless Landowner is extremely scrupulous and willing to
police himself, the ordinance will have no deterring effect
standing alone. Moreover, even if Landowner is afraid of
violating prohibitive zoning ordinances, if he types his own
region and arbitrary dates into Airbnb’s search engine, a map
will appear, showing all the listings available in his area for
those dates and their prices. Thus Landowner will see that no
one is deterred by the ordinance, but rather people are
generating revenue by violating an ordinance that no one is
enforcing. Because Landowner is now incentivized not to
self-police, the prohibitive regulation is ineffective to prevent
Landowner from engaging in short-term renting.
Host-based regulations fail not only because there is a lack of
incentive for the host to self-police, but also because
home-sharing is hard to detect, making whistleblowing nearly
impossible. Returning to the hypothetical, suppose Landowner
has listed a spare bedroom in his home on Airbnb.com for a
reasonable price. Landowner receives a “request”64 from Gary
Guest to rent his spare room. Landowner accepts the request and
a pleasant rental experience follows. Of course, there is no alarm
sounding informing city officials that Landowner is engaging in a
prohibited land use. If no one witnesses and reports the activity
to the city, there cannot even be an attempt at enforcing the
ordinance. But even assuming a neighbor witnesses guests
coming and going from Landowner’s home, there is little
likelihood that such activity would be reported. To a neighbor,
the individual coming and going could just as likely be a visiting
friend or family member as an Airbnb guest, so a neighbor is
unlikely to report a fellow landowner unless there are other
indications of home-sharing occurring.
Furthermore, the inability of city officials to investigate alleged
home-sharers, even once home-sharing has been reported,
further proves that whistle blowing is an ineffective means of
regulating home-sharing. Continuing the hypothetical, assume
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65 Deputy Director of Planning Alan Bell, Short Term Rentals, EXECUTIVE OFFICES
L.A. DEP’T CITY PLAN. (Mar. 19, 2014), http://cityplanning.lacity.org/code_studies/
misc/shortterm rentals.pdf [http://perma.cc/2PNN-RLNK].
66 Emily Alpert Reyes, Los Angeles Gives Hosts, Neighbors Mixed Signals on Short-term
Rentals, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/lame-adv-illegal-rentals-20150208-story.html#page=1 [http://perma.cc/3BZ8-6NA5].
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Samaan, supra note 43.
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Nathan Neighbor, who lives across the street from Landowner,
somehow learns that Guest is actually a short-term renter from
Airbnb.com. He calls the local officials and states that he believes
Landowner is engaged in a prohibited land use—short-term
renting. A city official arrives, knocks on Landowner’s door, and
asks Landowner if he is renting his room short-term to Guest.
Landowner says “no.” Absent any additional evidence that
Landowner is renting out his room short-term on Airbnb.com,
this is likely the end of the investigation.
For many municipalities and neighborhoods across the
United States, this hypothetical is not far from what actually
occurs when anti-home-sharing residents attempt to blow the
whistle on their neighbors. In Los Angeles for instance,
short-term rentals violate zoning ordinances and are generally
subject to fines if discovered, 65 yet just as in the
above-hypothetical, enforcement is scarcely called upon and
largely ineffective when it is.66 One spokesman from the Building
Department of Los Angeles stated that “it is extremely difficult to
prove someone is illegally renting out a home.”67 Upon being
notified, a building department official could knock on the door of
the alleged short-term rental location and ask if the owner is
renting short-term, but if the owner denies it, that is the end of
the investigation.68 To pursue the matter further, someone from
the Building Department would need to solicit a search warrant
from a judge to investigate for “serious violations [of a zoning
ordinance] that threaten life, limb or property.”69 The unlikelihood
of seeking and obtaining such a warrant for every alleged
short-term rental is obvious, and considering the fact that
thousands of L.A. residents still list their units on Airbnb today,
it appears home-sharers are aware of the unlikelihood that they
will be discovered and fined.70 In sum, because home-sharing is
popular, profitable, and difficult to prove, zoning regulations that
target users and rely on self-policing and whistleblowing are
ineffective to actually regulate home-sharing.
Preexisting user-targeting regulations such as zoning codes
are not the only regulations that fail to effectuate meaningful

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 136 Side B

05/09/2016 12:16:02

Do Not Delete

612

5/6/16 1:57 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 19:2

regulation of home-sharing. On the contrary, San Francisco has
shown that even legislation specifically crafted to regulate
home-sharing also fails.71 Like Los Angeles, San Francisco has
experienced a substantial shrinkage of its rental housing market
as a result of home-sharing.72 Perhaps since San Francisco is
“ground-zero” for home-sharing (as it is the birthplace of Airbnb
as well as the location of its headquarters),73 it is one of the first
cities to pass legislation specifically to address the effects of
home-sharing on the rental housing market.
In October 2014, San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors
approved, and the Mayor signed into law, a bill aimed at
regulating home-sharing within the city, commonly referred to as
the “Airbnb Law.”74 David Chiu, President of the Board, stated
that the law is an attempt at “a balanced solution that protects
housing from hotel conversion while allowing some flexibility for
residents to help them afford to stay in their homes.”75 In a
nutshell, the Airbnb Law legalizes short-term rentals inasmuch
as they were prohibited by the City’s former zoning code, with
some caveats:76 only primary residential units (units occupied by
the permanent resident for at least 275 days out of the year) may
be listed on home-sharing platforms as short-term rentals; listing
a property for rent when the host is not present is limited to
ninety days out of the year; and hosts are required to register
with the city planning department and obtain a permit in
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71 See Jay Barmann, Airbnb Law Impossible to Enforce, Says Agency Tasked with
Enforcement, SFIST (Mar. 23, 2015, 4:30 PM), http://sfist.com/2015/03/23/airbnb_law_
impossible_to_enforce_sa.php [http://perma.cc/H82B-UF8Q]; see also Matier & Ross, ‘No
way of Enforcing’ Airbnb Law, S.F. Planning Memo Says, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 22, 2015),
http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/No-way-of-enforcing-Airbnb-law-SF-planning-6151592.php [http://perma.cc/A5VD-ZWLY].
72 See Rachel Swan, Protesters Accuse Airbnb of Desecrating San Francisco’s
Neighborhoods, S.F. W KLY. (Oct. 27, 2014, 11:25 AM), http://www.sfweekly.com/
thesnitch/2014/10/27/protesters-accuse-airbnb-of-killing-san-franciscos-neighborhoods
[http://perma.cc/7R37-NGFE]; see also Carolyn Said, Window into Airbnb’s Hidden Impact
on S.F., S.F. CHRON. (June 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/business/ item/Window-intoAirbnb-s-hidden-impact-on-S-F-30110.php [http://perma.cc/PAK2-LF9C]; Dara Kerr, Sen.
Feinstein Urges San Francisco Not to Pass ‘Airbnb Law’, CNET MAG. (Oct. 20, 2014, 7:28
PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/sen-feinstein-urges-san-francisco-not-to-pass-airbnb-law/
[http://perma.cc/9V83-JE8Z].
73 Lisa Davis, To BnB – or Not?, CAL. LAW. (Nov. 2014), https://ww2.callawyer.com/
Clstory.cfm?eid=937933&wteid=937933_To_BnB_-_or_Not? [http://perma. cc/9APZ-VHR9].
74 Dara Kerr, Sen. Feinstein Urges San Francisco Not To Pass ‘Airbnb Law’, CNET
MAG. (Oct. 20, 2014, 7:28 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/sen-feinstein-urges-san-francisconot-to-pass-airbnb-law/ [http://perma.cc/9V83-JE8Z].
75 Dara Kerr, San Francisco Mayor Signs Law Making Airbnb Legal, CNET MAG.
(Oct. 28, 2014, 1:25 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/san-francisco-mayor-makes-airbnblaw-official/ [http://perma.cc/574A-HHZU].
76 Stephen Fishman, Overview of Airbnb Law in San Francisco, NOLO, http://
www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/overview-airbnb-law-san-francisco.html [http://perma.cc/5C9UR9SV].
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81 Id.
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SFGATE (Mar. 3, 2015, 1:52 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/S-F-Airbnb-lawoff-to-slow-start-hosts-say-6110902.php [http://perma.cc/KU38-RGCN].
83 Matier & Ross, supra note 71.
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exchange for a fifty-dollar fee every two years.77 Additionally, the
Airbnb Law requires that prospective hosts register their activity
with the City’s Planning Department.78 While at first blush this
legislation appears promising, upon closer inspection it bears the
same fatal flaw as zoning ordinances that prohibit short-term
rentals: it targets users and relies on self-policing and
whistleblowing to be effective. Unsurprisingly then, since the
Airbnb Law was enacted, San Francisco residents and city
officials alike have described it as “a mess.”79
Because the Airbnb Law relies on self-policing, it fails in the
same fashion as the zoning ordinances that preceded it. For
home-sharers, the registration process is so cumbersome that
compliance is difficult and unappealing. The registration process
mandates that every host interested in listing their property on a
home-sharing website fill out an application; provide a number of
documents as proof of permanent residency;80 present a Business
Registration Certificate to the planning department; present
proof of liability insurance covering at least $500,000; present a
signed affidavit agreeing to abide by all conditions of the
short-term residential rental ordinance; and last but not least,
present and a fifty-dollar check made out to the San Francisco
Planning Department.81 Due to the sheer intensity of the
registration process, the incentive to participate is low, and
home-sharers are unlikely to police themselves into compliance.
The fact that only about two percent of home-sharers have even
attempted to comply with the new regulations suggests that this
is true. As of March 2015, there were at least 6000 short-term
rentals operating in San Francisco listed on various home-sharing
websites (5000 of which were listed on Airbnb.com), and of those
hosts, only 159 have applied for the mandatory registration.82
The Airbnb Law is further ineffective because, just like with
ordinances, the entity in charge of enforcement, the San
Francisco Planning Department, lacks the ability to effectively
enforce the Law.83 In order to enforce the Airbnb Law, the
Planning Department would need some way to track and locate
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hosts that are noncompliant. But to do so it would need to be able
to cross-reference its record of registered hosts with hosts on
home-sharing websites to discover the identities and locations of
non-register hosts. The only entity capable of accurately
collecting and reviewing the names and locations of all hosts on
its website are the home-sharing websites themselves, but for the
time being, they do not cooperate with city officials.84
Additionally, the Planning Department claims it would need
home-sharing companies to monitor their sites and actually
prohibit users from accepting more than ninety days worth of
guest requests for rentals in multi-dwelling buildings in San
Francisco, 85 but home-sharing websites decline to do this as well.
Given that the San Francisco Planning Department needs
meaningful cooperation from home-sharing websites to effectively
enforce the new Airbnb Law, without such cooperation, the law is
just as impotent as the preexisting zoning code it was designed to
replace.86
The problems of self-policing and whistleblowing that
frustrate the effectiveness of city-enacted regulations also
prevent regulation of home-sharing on a smaller scale.
Homeowners Associations (“HOAs”), with few exceptions, are
equally incapable of regulating home-sharing as municipalities
because, just like municipalities, HOA regulations target users of
home-sharing websites. As demonstrated above, when a
regulation targets users, its success is tied to the users’
willingness to self-police or third parties’ ability to blow the
whistle. While the smaller size of an HOA compared to a
municipality can reduce some barriers to enforcement, for the
most part, HOA regulations targeting home-sharing still fail.
When a landowner purchases property governed by an HOA,
he agrees to abide by the CC&Rs. A common restriction in
CC&Rs is a prohibition on short-term renting; thus most HOAs
make it a finable offense for one of its members to rent space in
their properties for less than thirty days. But still, the target of
the regulation is the host, and just like zoning ordinances or
specially crafted legislation, the regulation relies on self-policing
and whistle-blowing. Accordingly, before any regulation can
occur, a neighbor must report the offending property owner and
an HOA official must actually investigate the claim. The size of
neighborhoods compared to the size of cities gives HOAs an
advantage in that the HOA has fewer properties to police than a
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87 Jonathan Horn, Man Who Rented out Condo Fined $106K, U-T SAN DIEGO (Oct.
24, 2014, 4:55 PM), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/oct/24/airbnb-vrbo-mark-rentsteelers-gaslamp-condos/?#article-copy [http://perma.cc/G6P7-9GGC].
88 Id.
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95 Id.; see also Ariel Bedell, Short-Term Vacation Rentals and Homeowners
Associations (HOAs), LOFTIN FIRM, P.C. (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.loftinfirm.com/blog/
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96 Horn, supra note 87.
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municipality, but generally speaking, that advantage is still
insufficient to overcome inherent problems with user-based
regulations. However, a minority of HOAs have demonstrated
that with the right infrastructure and extreme vigilance, they
can overcome the barriers to whistleblowing and enforce their
prohibitions on home-sharing to some degree. Take for example,
the case of The Mark Condominium Association in downtown
San Diego.87
Thomas Stevens lived in a condo in a high-rise run by The
Mark Condominium Association in downtown San Diego.88 At the
time Stevens bought his condo, he agreed to the CC&Rs (as is
always a condition of purchasing a dwelling controlled by an
HOA).89 The CC&Rs of the condominium prohibited rentals of
less than 90 days,90 yet Stevens, either in ignorance or disregard
of the prohibition, decided to list his condo on a home-sharing
website.91 Stevens was eventually discovered by his HOA when
one of his guests revealed to a receptionist at the building that
she was a short-term renter.92 The HOA then fined Stevens
$350.93 Apparently this was but a slap on the wrist to Stevens,
who reportedly pocketed $2,500 from the week-long rental which
resulted in the fine.94 Perhaps Stevens continued to somehow
remain ignorant of the specifics of the CC&Rs after his fine, or
perhaps simple math (Stevens’ large profit margin despite the
fine) is a better explanation for why Stevens continued to list his
condo on home-sharing websites. However, Stevens was eventually
sued by The Mark. 95 Initially, Steven tried what many
home-sharers are likely to do—he claimed his guests were
friends or family members, but to no avail.96 While the frequency
of Stevens’ rental activities were disputed in litigation, a
Superior Court Judge ultimately found for The Mark, and
concluded that Stevens was in breach of his contract (the
CC&Rs) with The Mark.97 The court awarded the condominium
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roughly $16,000 in costs, and $90,000 in attorneys’ fees for breach of
contract.98 If the math was not simple before, it certainly is now:
Stevens’ home-sharing activities earned him a few thousand
dollars, but in the end it cost him over a hundred thousand, and
Stevens had to sell his condo to pay for the ordeal.99
While Stevens’ story may be a cautionary tale for some
home-sharers, it is unlikely to deter the majority of homeowners
from home-sharing because there are two characteristics of The
Mark that are unique to high-rise style HOAs that make
enforcement of anti-home-sharing regulations possible. The first
characteristic is the dense, vertical layout of a condominium style
HOA. As one general manager of a high-rise condominium
pointed out, “you’re not going to keep anything secret in a
vertical village.”100 First, management is likely to be working in
the lobby for several hours a day and is likely to take notice of
any unusual increase in new faces or non-residents coming and
going with luggage. Second, the residents all use the same
parking structure, elevators, hallways, lobby, and common-areas,
making it much easier for whistleblowing neighbors to be aware
of short-term guests coming and going than in typical low density
residential areas.
The second characteristic unique to condominium-style
HOAs is the apartment-like management system. Unlike typical
HOAs, which are policed by a board of elected, volunteer
homeowners, high-rise condominium HOAs like The Mark are
policed by paid managerial staff.101 Since they are paid to keep
the condominium functioning smoothly for all members,
condominium managers have the time and motivation to
vigilantly watch for activities such as home-sharing that
threaten the quiet enjoyment (and thereby the value) of the
condos. A general manager of one condominium complex in
downtown San Diego stated he “checks sites like Airbnb every
two weeks to see if people are advertising their units,” and
checks those websites even more frequently during times of
increased tourism in the city.102 Unlike these downtown high-rise
condominiums, most neighborhood HOAs are not patrolled by
paid managerial staff, and thus they are unable to go to such
lengths to investigate for home-sharing.
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While the HOA of a high-rise condominium complex may be
in an advantageous position to weed out short-term rentals, they
are the exception. Neither of the two characteristics that
overcome enforcement difficulties are found in typical, sprawling,
single-family-home style HOAs. Unlike The Mark and similarly
situated HOAs, most HOAs are still barred from enforcing
anti-home-sharing regulations by a lack of self-policing and
whistleblowing.
Whether the regulation of home-sharing is citywide or
neighborhood specific, if such a regulation targets hosts, it is
unlikely to be effective. The majority of cities and HOAs do not
have the resources or ability to monitor hosts regularly, and
neither do neighbors. Because there is no enforcement, and the
potential for revenue is great, users are not incentivized to
self-police. Therefore, regulatory attempts thus far have resulted
in little to no change in the home-sharing industry; the costs of
the negative externalities are still fully borne by those outside of
the industry. This epic failure of legislative regulation suggests
that another cost-shifting tool is needed to address the negative
externalities generated by the proliferation of home-sharing
across the United States.
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III. USING NUISANCE LAW TO TARGET WEBSITES AND
EFFECTIVELY REGULATE HOME-SHARING
As discussed above, home-sharing generates substantial
negative externalities, the cost of which are currently borne by
individuals and entities who do not participate in home-sharing.
Meanwhile, the P2P nature of the home-sharing industry
frustrates traditional methods of regulatory enforcement, making
regulatory attempts to mitigate the negative impacts ineffective.
But where regulations fail, the common law can succeed. Recent
case law regarding digital P2P platforms shows that common law
rules of fault-based liability can be used to hold the creators of
P2P platforms liable for the damages caused by third parties
using their platforms.103 Thus the common law acts as a
cost-shifting mechanism for negative externalities: when a
company generates substantial negative externalities, if the
company is found liable, it must pay the damages—i.e. the cost of
the negative externalities. Furthermore, once liability has been
established, the company will be compelled to implement new
business methods that insulate the company from liability. In
other words, the company will stop producing negative
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externalities, or else it will pay the cost of them in court.
Therefore, in the event that legislative action fails to regulate an
industry, the common law can be used to shift the costs of the
negative externalities caused by home-sharing away from the
general public and onto the cost-generating industry.
The cases of A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. and
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. provide the
framework for applying rules of fault-based liability to digital
P2P platforms. In 1999, Napster, Inc. created a P2P platform
that allowed users to share music, and in 2001, Grokster, Ltd.
created a P2P platform that allowed users to share music and
movies.104 The practices of music sharing and movie sharing caused
a negative externality—wide-spread copyright infringement—and
for a time the cost of the externality (lost profits) was borne by
music and movie producers. However, once these companies were
taken to court, the cost of copyright infringement was shifted
from music and movie producers onto Napster and Grokster
respectively.
In 1999, Shawn Fanning developed one of the first digital
P2P platforms, Napster, Inc.—a file-sharing service that made it
fast and simple for users to share music over the Internet.105
With the help of a few programmers, Fanning launched his
software and incorporated Napster, Inc.106 Within months, user
numbers skyrocketed, billions of songs were being shared, and
Napster generated substantial revenue through venture
capitalists’ investments. Unfortunately for Napster, however, the
negative externalities generated from music sharing were
substantial enough to compel those affected by them to take
action,107 and less than a year after its creation Napster, Inc. was
sued by the RIAA (Recording Industry Association of America)
for copyright infringement.108
At the trial court level, Napster was enjoined from operating
based on claims of copyright infringement.109 Eventually
appearing before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,110 Napster
defended its liability by citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., a case in which Sony was sued for its sale of
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Videocassette Recorders (“VCRs”).111 To give a brief history, when
VCRs became available to the general public, several copyright
owners of television programs sued Sony for copyright
infringement, arguing that by distributing a product that allows
consumers to record and re-watch television programs, Sony was
contributorily infringing on their copyrights.112 Simply put, the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that because the VCR
was equally capable of being used by consumers for noninfringing
purposes, sales of VCRs to the public did not constitute
contributory infringement of copyrights.113
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Napster’s software from the
VCR, pointing out the VCR “did not distribute taped television
broadcasts,” but rather merely allowed users to watch them at a
different time, whereas the technological process of Napster’s
software actually involved duplicating and subsequently
distributing copyrighted material to the general public.114 The
Ninth Circuit ultimately upheld a modified injunctive order and
mandated Napster remove all infringing material from its
servers.115 By 2002, Napster ceased doing business as a
music-sharing company,116 however, the company since has been
bought and now conducts legitimate business as Rhapsody. Thus
in the end, the judicial system was able to shift the cost of the
negative externalities caused by file-sharing back on the
company that controlled the practice, and the company then
found a business practice that eliminated those externalities.
Though Napster was the first company to use digital P2P
platforms with disregard for the negative impacts on third
parties, they were far from the last. Grokster, Ltd., emerged on
the heels of Napster in 2001, and like Napster, Grokster used a
P2P platform to enable users to exchange not only music, but
movie files as well.117 Grokster was nearly identical to Napster in
purpose—allowing users to freely share movies and music files
over the Internet—but Grokster employed an essential
“technological tweak” that distinguished itself from the
music-sharing pioneer from a liability perspective.118 Napster’s
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software allowed users to search through each other’s computers
and share copyrighted music with one another, but in the
process, each music file shared would pass through Napster’s
servers electronically. In the eyes of the Ninth Circuit, this gave
Napster a degree of control over copyrighted material after it was
sent from a sender and before it arrived on the receiver’s
computer. This control was a significant factor in finding Napster
liable for contributory copyright infringement.119 However,
Grokster’s software “abandoned centralized servers, allowing
users to connect directly with each other.”120 So unlike Napster,
Grokster maintained no control over the files being sent using its
software and therefore believed it could not be viewed as the
distributor of copyrighted material and would not be held liable
for copyright infringement as Napster was.
This belief was in fact shared by the District Court for the
Central District of California when Grokster was eventually sued
by a number of copyright holders claiming that Grokster
“knowingly and intentionally distributed their software to enable
users to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted works.”121 The
District Court held that since Grokster retained no control over
the activities of its users, and because the file-sharing software
could be used for noninfringing purposes, it was protected from
liability based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Sony case.122
The case was ultimately appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and reversed the
rulings of the District Court and Court of Appeals, finding
Grokster liable for contributory copyright infringement.123 One of
the many factors that led the Court to its decision included the
fact that Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (“MGM”) had “commissioned a
statistician to conduct a systematic search [using Grokster’s
software], and his study showed that nearly 90% of the files
available for download on [Grokster’s network] were copyrighted
works.”124 Additionally, Grokster conceded its awareness that
users typically employed its software primarily to download
copyrighted files, since MGM had previously notified Grokster of
roughly eight million copyrighted files that could be obtained
using its software.125 Discovery also showed that Grokster
adamantly promoted and marketed itself as software that
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enables users to download copyrighted works, and Grokster made
no effort to filter copyrighted material from the network or
otherwise prohibit the sharing of copyrighted files.126 The Court
found that overall, the facts indicated that Grokster was not a
mere passive creator of a digital P2P platform that allowed for
possible infringement, but rather, it had “clearly voiced the
objective that recipients use it to download copyrighted works.”127
Despite these findings, Grokster attempted to argue that
“because it was the users themselves who searched for, retrieved,
and stored the infringing files,” Grokster was like Sony and could
not be said to have materially contributed to its user’s copyright
infringement.128 The Court disagreed, stating that the lower
courts misinterpreted the Sony rule to mean “that whenever a
product is capable of substantial lawful use, the producer can
never be held contributorily liable for third parties’ infringing use
of it.”129 Rather, the Court clarified that “nothing in Sony
requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such
evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of
fault-based liability derived from the common law.”130
Ultimately, because Grokster “showed itself to be aiming to
satisfy a known source of demand for copyright infringement,”
Grokster never “attempted to develop filter tools or other
mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity,” and “the
commercial sense” of Grokster’s enterprise turned on
high-volume infringing use, the Court could infer Grokster’s
intent to induce and encourage its user to directly infringe on the
plaintiff’s copyrights, and concluded by stating that Grokster’s
“unlawful objective [was] unmistakable.”131
The Supreme Court’s decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer can
be applied to home-sharing to the extent that it provides a
frame-work for analyzing the liability of P2P platform creators.
Although Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer revolved around a copyright
dispute, the Supreme Court’s decision was based on “rules of
fault-based liability derived from the common law” that go
beyond copyright law.132 Thus, through Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
the Supreme Court iterated a general rule (“the MGM rule”)
regarding P2P networks: when a cause of action can establish
third-party liability, the fact that a P2P platform is capable of
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lawful use, standing alone, will not shield the creator of the
platform from liability. If the P2P platform’s primary intent is to
facilitate unlawful activity, the party who creates and has the
power to regulate the platform can be held liable based on a
common law cause of action for the damages caused by
third-party use of the platform. Since home-sharing websites are
similar to Grokster in that they create and have the power to
regulate their P2P networks, the rule from Grokster can be
applied to analyze whether home-sharing websites can be liable
for the negative externalities caused by third-parties activities on
their websites.
By combining the MGM rule with nuisance law,
home-sharing websites can conceivably be held liable for
damages caused by the unlawful activity of third parties using
their platforms. Like the common law cause of action for
contributory copyright infringement, the common law cause of
action for private nuisance allows a plaintiff to hold a defendant
liable for the unlawful acts of third parties. Before
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, a home-sharing website may have been
able to claim that because its P2P platform is equally capable of
lawful use, it could not be liable for a claim of private nuisance.
However, after Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, the fact that a P2P
platform is capable of lawful use is not a bar to a plaintiff’s
recovery from a defendant for third-party torts, when the action
is based on a common law cause of action. If a plaintiff can show
that the primary intent of a home-sharing P2P platform is to
facilitate unlawful home-sharing, the home-sharing website itself
could be held liable for the damages caused by the unlawful
home-sharing of third-parties.
As stated by the Supreme Court of California, liability for
private nuisance arises when a plaintiff can establish
“interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment” of their
property.133 And while the law recognizes that “[l]ife in organized
society . . . involves an unavoidable clash of individual interests,”
the law will also recognize “liability for damages . . . in those
cases in which the harm or risk to one is greater than he ought to
be required to bear under the circumstances.”134 Furthermore,
the Restatement of Torts, Second, provides that “the fact that
other persons contributes to the nuisance is not a bar to the
defendant’s liability,”135 and “one is subject to liability for a
nuisance caused by an activity, not only when he carries on the

San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 696 (Cal. 1996).
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840(e) (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
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activity but also when he participates to a substantial extent in
carrying it on.”136
Given that courts across the U.S. have enunciated the
well-established tenet of private nuisance law, which states that
a defendant can be held liable for contributing to the nuisance,
assisting in the creation of nuisance,137 controlling that which
creates the nuisance,138 participating in the nuisance,139 and even
instructing others to create a nuisance,140 it cannot be gainsaid
that nuisance law allows for a plaintiff to recover from a
defendant for the tortious actions of third-parties—much like the
laws of copyright expounded upon by the Supreme Court in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. Accordingly, if a plaintiff can establish all
of the elements of private nuisance, under the MGM rule, that
plaintiff may be able to not only bring a cause of action against a
home-sharing company for private nuisance, but actually recover
damages for the nuisances caused by third-parties—the users.
To establish a prima facie case for private nuisance, a
plaintiff must establish: (1) the defendant committed an act;141
(2) the act was a substantial invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in
the private use or enjoyment of his land;142 and (3) the invasion
was unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular
case.143 Analyzing each of these elements in turn reveals that if a
class of landowners become so inclined—conceivably motivated
by the perpetual nuisances of short-term rentals in their
neighborhoods—they could establish a prima facie showing of
private nuisance against a home-sharing website like Airbnb.com.
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136 Id. § 834; see also Cty. of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d
313, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (stating “liability for nuisance does not hinge on whether the
defendant owns, possesses or controls the property, nor on whether he is in a position to
abate the nuisance; the critical question is whether the defendant created or assisted in
the creation of the nuisance”) (quoting City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Superior
Court, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 865, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), as modified on denial of reh’g (June
28, 2004)).
137 Cty. of Santa Clara, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325; Shurpin v. Elmhirst, 195 Cal. Rptr.
737, 740–41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
138 City of Greenwood v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., 299 S.W.3d 606, 621 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2009); Rosenfeld v. Thoele, 28 S.W.3d 446, 452 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
139 Abbatiello v. Monsanto Co., 522 F. Supp.2d 524, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. Singer Warehouse & Trucking Corp., 447 N.Y.S.2d 265, 266
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
140 California Dept. of Toxic Substances Control v. Payless Cleaners, College
Cleaners, 368 F.Supp 2d. 1069, 1081 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (stating “[n]uisance liability also
extends to defendants who create ‘a system that causes hazardous wastes to be disposed
of improperly, or who instruct users’ to do so”) (citing Selma Pressure Treating Co.
v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)).
141 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 824.
142 San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 696 (Cal. 1996);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822.
143 San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 920 P.2d at 696; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 822 comment (c).
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First, the class could assert that Airbnb participated to a
substantial extent in the act of home-sharing by creating a P2P
platform that instructs and allows third-parties (users) to list
their properties for rent short term. While the act of unlawful
home-sharing is directly done by the third-party that lists their
property for rent on Airbnb.com, as stated above, the laws of
private nuisance state that one who substantially contributes to
an unreasonable invasion can also be held liable. Thus, the fact
that Airbnb.com is not the party listing the property for rent
unlawfully would not defeat the assertion that Airbnb.com has
committed an act for the purposes of making a prima facie
showing of private nuisance.
Second, the class could establish that Airbnb’s act of
instructing and allowing users to create short-term rentals was a
substantial invasion of their respective interests in the private
use and enjoyment of land by pointing to the negative
externalities caused by home-sharing on residential neighborhoods.
For instance, if the plaintiff class included residents of Silver
Lake, Los Angeles, the class could point to the increased traffic,
noise, transients, and subsequent effects on property values of
the neighborhood, as facts sufficient to establish that, by enabling
unlawful home-sharing, Airbnb has substantially invaded their
interest in the private use and enjoyment of their land.
The last hurdle the plaintiff-class would have to leap over
would be the establishment of Airbnb’s invasion of their interests
as unreasonable.144 When determining whether an invasion of an
interest is unreasonable, courts consider “whether the gravity of
the harm outweighs the social utility of the defendant’s
conduct.”145 As is apparent from the language, this test is a
fact-based inquiry, and in general, is “to be determined by the
trier of fact in each case.”146 Conceivably then, a class of
landowners could succeed in establishing Airbnb’s invasion as
unreasonable by making an offer of proof as to the aggregate
monetary diminishment of properties owned by members of the
class as a result of home-sharing facilitated by Airbnb, and by
offering objective, fact-based reports that show the negative
impact of unregulated home-sharing on the cost of living in dense
areas. The diminishment of property values would speak to the
gravity of harm caused by Airbnb, while the reports of Airbnb’s
negative impact on cost of living in dense areas would point out a
lack of social utility in Airbnb’s actions.

San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 920 P.2d at 696.
Id. at 697.
Id.
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Because the common-law tort of nuisance allows for certain
contributors to the nuisance to be held liable for the
unreasonable invasions of third-parties, if a plaintiff class is one
day successful in pleading all the elements of private nuisance,
the plaintiff class could then argue that the MGM rule should be
applied, for just like Napster and Grokster, Airbnb is the creator
of a P2P network that results in tortious action. Accordingly, a
court will then be able to consider whether the same factors of
fault-based liability that led to Grokster being held liable in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer are present in home-sharing companies
like Airbnb.
Under the MGM rule in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, the Court
concluded that Grokster could be held liable for torts of
third-parties using its platform because its primary intent was to
facilitate unlawful activity. The Court reached this conclusion by
finding that three factors were present: (1) Grokster was aiming
to satisfy a demand for unlawful activity (copyright infringement);
(2) Grokster did not attempt to reduce the amount of unlawful
activity that took place in its network; and (3) the more activity
that took place on Grokster’s network, the more profitable the
company became, and most of the activity was unlawful. Thus if
the same three factors can be proven of a home-sharing website
such as Airbnb, like Grokster, that home-sharing website could
be held liable for the torts of third-parties using its platform.
To continue to use Airbnb as an example, a plaintiff class of
landowners could make a strong argument that the second two
factors that gave rise to the fault-based liability of Grokster’s
P2P network under the MGM rule are present in Airbnb’s P2P
network as well. First, Airbnb does not attempt to reduce the
amount of unlawful activity taking place on its network. Airbnb
knows or has reason to know that home-sharing is prohibited in
several areas, but yet Airbnb makes no substantial effort to limit
its potential to be used by people living in those areas. For
example, if Airbnb so desired, it could prohibit users from posting
a short-term rental located in places like The Mark Condominiums,
or prohibit users from listing properties in violation of San
Francisco’s Airbnb Law, but it does not. Thus, by continuing to
make its platform available to all landowners everywhere,
without limitation, Airbnb is declining to reduce the amount of
unlawful activity taking place on its network.
It could be argued that because Airbnb has content on its
website encouraging users to consult their leases, HOAs, and
local regulatory agencies, it does in fact attempt to limit the
amount of unlawful activity taking place on its website. However,
the content can only be found by clicking on a small link titled
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“FAQs for Housing” at the very bottom of Airbnb’s webpage,
while the words “List Your Property” appear in large, colorful
font in the center of the page.147 Furthermore, at no point in the
listing process is the user re-directed to the page with the content
that encourages hosts to check with the various regulatory
entities.148 In light of these circumstances, the fact that Airbnb
warns users to check with local regulations may carry little
weight. Therefore, a class would most likely still be able to
establish that Airbnb does not limit the amount of unlawful
activity on its website, despite the fact that at some point it
encourages users to check local regulations.
Second, a plaintiff class could assert that, like Grokster, the
more activity that takes place on Airbnb’s network, the more
profitable it becomes, since Airbnb takes a commission from
every transaction occurring on its website. Furthermore, after
propounding extensive discovery, the class would also likely be
able to assert that the majority of short-term listings on Airbnb’s
website are unlawful in one way or another (violative of city
ordinance, HOA regulation, lease agreement, etc.), for as discussed
supra, there were nearly 5000 unlawful units listed on Airbnb in
March 2015 in San Francisco alone.149 Indeed, the plaintiffs in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, were able to establish the majority of the
activity taking place on Grokster’s network was illegal by hiring
a statistician to determine the percentage of file downloads on
Grokster’s network that were copyrighted files. Perhaps the
future class could even hire the same statistician. Thus, with the
help of a detailed investigation, a plaintiff asserting a claim of
private nuisance could establish that, like Grokster, the more
activity that occurs on Airbnb’s network, the more profitable it
becomes, and most of the activity is unlawful.
The biggest challenge for a class of landowners using the
MGM rule to assert a claim of private nuisance against a
home-sharing company like Airbnb would be to establish that,
like Grokster, Airbnb is aiming to satisfy a demand for unlawful
activity. Though not impossible, the success of that argument
would depend on whether the class can establish that despite
Airbnb’s efforts to encourage users to check with local laws and
regulations, Airbnb is still encouraging users in restricted areas
to list their properties for rent on Airbnb.com. The class may be
able to succeed if it can show that Airbnb still targets restricted
home-owners through its marketing campaigns. Accordingly, if a

See generally AIRBNB, supra note 64.
Id.
Said, supra note 82.
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plaintiff can show that Airbnb solicits and induces homeowners
or lessees to violate regulations and list their properties on
Airbnb.com, a plaintiff could establish that, like Grokster, Airbnb
is aiming to satisfy a demand for unlawful activity.
In sum, because the common law tort of private nuisance can
be used to hold a defendant liable for the torts of third-parties,
using the MGM rule, a court could find Airbnb liable for private
nuisance. Under the MGM rule, the mere fact that Airbnb can be
used for lawful activity does not bar defendants from recovery.
Airbnb created the platform, and has the power to regulate it.
Thus if a court determines all the elements of private nuisance
are met and the primary purpose of Airbnb’s P2P network is to
facilitate unlawful activity, a court could hold Airbnb liable for
the damages caused by the users of its website.
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CONCLUSION
Home-sharing is a rapidly growing new industry that
provides for utilization of an often unused resource (space), but
the negative externalities that result are numerous and
substantial. In communities where home-sharing is prevalent,
landowners experience invasions of their property interests
typically associated with commercial activities. Meanwhile, the
cost of living for the city as a whole rises, as units of rental
housing are converted into permanent short-term rentals,
reducing the overall supply and driving the price of those
remaining units upward. Because the costs of these externalities
are currently borne by those outside the home-sharing industry
there is a demand for regulation, but due to challenges presented
by digital P2P platforms, regulatory methods both new and old
that are designed to address such externalities fail to shift the
costs of the negative externalities onto the home-sharing
industry. However, where legislative regulations fail, the
common law can succeed. Once aggregate damages reach a
tipping point, a plaintiff class of landowners may bring a lawsuit
for private nuisance against home-sharing companies
themselves, and using the rule of P2P platform liability stated by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, that class may
just prevail. If so, the defendant home-sharing website will be
forced to account for the negative externalities caused by the
industry, or cease to do business in the manner in which they
currently operate. As such, the common law will have provided
the mechanism for shifting the costs of home-sharing back to the
industry.

